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Collateral Estoppel: Loosening the Mutuality Rule
in Tax Litigation
Collateral estoppel is an aspect of the doctrine of res judicata1
that precludes relitigation of issues previously adjudicated. A judgment in a prior action may be held conclusive as to issues in a subsequent case. even though the later case technically involves a different
cause of action.2 The rule of collateral estoppel seeks to conserve

I. The term "res judicata" covers the general law of the finality and effect of prior
judgments as influencing subsequent litigation, REsrATEMENT oF JUDGMENTS, Introductory Note § 41 (1942) [hereinafter RFSl"ATEMENT]. Other doctrines under its general
heading include merger. bar. and direct estoppel. Merger and bar preclude parties
from relitigating the same cause of action. If a judgment was rendered for the plaintiff, his cause of action is merged in the judgment and he cannot thereafter bring another suit on the same cause of action. REsrATEMENT, supra. §§ 45(a), 47. E.g., Dearden
v. Hey, 804 Mass. 659, 24 N.E.2d 644 (1989). If a judgment is rendered on the merits
against the plaintiff, the original cause of action is barred. RFSl"ATEMENT, supra, §§ 45
(b), 48, E.g., Thompson v. Washington Natl, Bank, 68 Wash. 42, 122 P. 606 (1912),
Direct estoppel precludes the plaintiff from litigating the same issue that was litigated
in a prior action. For example, if an action is dismissed for the nonjoinder of a third
person as defendant and the plaintiff brings another action on the same cause of action, again without joining the third person, the necessity of joinder may not be relitigated. Where a judgment for the defendant is not based on the merits, however,
the plaintiff is not barred from maintaining a subsequent action, REsrATEMENT, supra,
§§ 45(d), 49.

2, REsrATEMENT, supra note I. § 68(1). Collateral estoppel may apply to questions
of law as well as fact, provided that both causes of action arise out of the same subject
matter or transaction. RFSl"ATEMENT, supra, § 70. E.g., Tait v. Western Md. Ry. Co.,
289 U.S. 620, 626 (1988): United States v. Moser, 266 U.S. 286, 241-42 (1924).
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judicial energy,8 promote confidence in the judicial system,4 avoid
litigant expense,5 promote community peace and reliance on judgments,6 and minimize inconsistent results.7 Countervailing policy
concerns are the right of each person to have his day in court,8 the
fear of increased litigation,9 the danger of perpetuating error,10 the
need for flexibility,11 and other considerations of fairness. 12 Whether
a court will apply collateral estoppel in a certain case will often be
determined by a weighing of these conflicting policies.18
If the facts in the second action parallel those of the first, but arise out of a su&'
ceeding transaction, collateral estoppel may not apply. REsrATEMENT, supra, § 70, comment e. E.g., Commissioner v. Sunnen, 333 U.S. 591, 599-601 (1948).
A change in the law through judicial decision, e.g., Blair v. Commissioner, 300 U.S.
5, 9 (1937), statute, e.g., Boeing v. United States, 98 F. Supp. 581, 586 (Ct. Cl. 1951), or
administrative regulation, e.g., Continental Oil Co. v. Jones, 176 F.2d 519, 522 (10th
Cir. 1949), may also limit the application of collateral estoppel. See text at notes 51-52
infra.
3. Commissioner v. Sunnen, 333 U.S. 591, 597 (1948); In re Hitchings, 342 F.2d 80,
85 (D,C. Cir. 1965); Westgate-Sun Harbor Co. v. Watson, 206 F.2d 458, 462 (D.C. Cir.
1953); Warthen v. United States, 157 Ct. Cl. 798, 800 (1962); Polasky, Collateral Es·
toppel-Ef/ects of Prior Litigation, 39 IowA L. R.Ev. 217, 219 (1954); von Moschzisker,
Res Judicata, 38 YALE L.J. 299, 300 (1929).
4. Kerotest Mfg. Co. v. C-O-Two Co., 342 U.S. 180, 185 (1952); Vestal, Rationale of
Preclusion, 9 ST. LOUIS u. L.J. 29, 33-34 (1964).
5. Liddell v. Smith, 345 F.2d 491, 493 (7th Cir. 1965); Wallingsford v. Larcon Co.,
237 F-2d 904, 906 (8th Cir. 1956); Hyman v. Regenstein, 222 F-2d 545, 549 (5th Cir.
1955); Van Dyke v. Kuhl, 171 F.2d 187, 188 (7th Cir. 1948); Warthen v. United States,
157 Ct. Cl. 798, 800 (1962).
6. United States v. Munsingwear, Inc., 340 U.S. 36, 38 (1950); Commissioner v. Sunnen, 333 U.S. 591, 597 (1948); von Moschzisker, supra note 3, at 300.
7. Developments in the Law-Res Judicata, 65 HARv. L. R.Ev. 818, 820 (1952) [hereinafter Developments]. The same general policy concerns pervade all aspects of res
judicata. See Polasky, supra note 3, at 219; Developments, supra, at 820. Consequently,
policy discussions that apply to one aspect of res judicata may be relevant for other
aspects as well. E.g., Developments, supra, at 840 n.161.
8. The right to a day in court is required under the due process clause. Hansberry
v. Lee, 311 U.S. 32, 42 (1940); Postal Tel. Cable Co. v. City of Newport, 247 U.S. 464,
476 (1918). Courts, however, have discussed the right in general terms without mentioning constitutional buttresses. E.g., United States v. Silliman, 167 F.2d 607, 614 {3d
Cir. 1948).
9. Pelham Hall Co. v. Hassett, 147 F.2d 63, 68 (1st Cir. 1945); Moore 8c Currier,
Mutuality and Conclusiveness of Judgements, 35 TUL. L. R.Ev. 301, 309 (1961).
10. United States v. Stone & Downer Co., 274 U.S. 225, 236 (1927); Union Metal Mfg.
Co., 4 B.T.A. 287, 288-89 (1925). It has been suggested that the problem of error perpetuation may be greater where complex legal issues are involved. Divine v. Commissioner, 500 F.2d 1041, 1048 (2d Cir. 1974). Contra, Blonder-Tongue Laboratories, Inc.
v. University of Illinois Foundation, 402 U.S. 313, 331-34 (1971); Evans & Robins, Demise of Mutuality in Collateral Estoppel (The Second Round Patent Suit-The NotSo-Instant Replay), 24 OKLA, L. REv. 179,205 (1971).
11. Polasky, supra note 3, at 221; Developments, supra note 7, at 820.
12. E.g., Title v. Immigration 8c Naturalization Serv., 322 F.2d 21, 24 (9th Cir. 1963).
13. Tipler v. E.I. duPont de Nemours & Co., 443 F.2d 125, 128 (6th Cir. 1971);
Seven-Up Co. v. Bubble Up Corp., 312 F.2d 472, 477 (D.C. Cir. 1963); Spilker v. Hankin, 188 F.2d 35, 38-39 (C.C.P.A. 1951); Greenfield v. Mather, 32 Cal. 2d 23, 35, 194
P.2d 1, 8 (1948); Vestal, Preclusion/Res Judicata Variables: Adjudicating Bodies, 54
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The mutuality rule is a principle that is used to limit the ap·
plication of collateral estoppel: 14 A judgment in a prior suit will
bar relitigation of the same issue in a subsequent action only where
both parties to the subsequent action, or their privies,1G are bound
by the prior judgment.16 Although the mutuality rule is currently
losing favor, 17 federal courts have continued to apply the rule
rigidly in tax litigation.18 This note will assume that the policy judgments behind the general movement away from the rule are sound,
and examine the arguments advanced in support of maintaining the
mutuality rule in federal tax litigation. It will be suggested that,
once the trend away from mutuality in other areas is accepted, there
GEO. L.J. 857, 858 (1966). For example, collateral estoppel will be applied only to is•
sues that actually were litigated and determined in the previous action and that were
essential, Yates v. United States, 354 U.S. 298, 337-38 (1957); Cromwell v. County of
Sac, 94 U.S. 351, 354-55 (1876); Scott, Collateral Estoppel by Judgment, 56 HARV, L.
REv. 1, 10-15 (1942); REsrATEMENT, supra note 1, § 68, comment m. The court in The
Evergreens v. Neeman, 141 F.2d 927, 928 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 373 U.S. 720 (1944),
distinguished between "ultimate" and "mediate" facts; only determinations of ultimate
facts-"those facts, upon whose combined occurrence raises the duty, or right in question"-would be conclusive in subsequent actions. The policy behind this distinction
is explored in Polasky, supra note 3, at 237-38; Developments, supra note 7, at 843,
For a catalog and discussion of other principles that may limit the application of
collateral estoppel, see Developments, supra, at 840-50.
14. Various attempts to defi~e the mutuality rule are summarized in Annot., 31
AL.R.3d 1044, 1060 (1970) (footnotes omitted):
The mutuality rule has been expressed by the courts in varying language, Thus,
it has been stated that an estoppel by judgment is mutual if both litigants arc
concluded by the judgment, and that otherwise it binds neither, Expressed in an•
other form, the estoppel effect of the judgment operates mutually if the person
taking advantage of the judgment would have been bound by it had it gone the
other way. It has also been said that the thrust of the mutuality rule is that
since one not a party to the former action cannot be bound by the judgment
therein, it necessarily follows that neither can he take advantage of it; that unless both parties are bound by the prior judgment, neither may use it against the
other in a subsequent action; and that a party should not be able to plead res
judicata of an issue unless the other party could have Jlleaded it against him had
the judgment been the other way. The mutuality rule has also been expressed to
the effect that nobody can take benefit by a verdict who would not have been
prejudiced by it had it gone contrary.
15. For a discussion of the terms "parties" and "privies," see Developments, supra
note 7, at 855-65.
16. 1 A. FREEMAN, JUDGMENTS § 407 (5th ed. E. Tuttle 1925); REsrATEI\IENT, supra
note I,§ 93.
17. Blonder-Tongue Laboratories, Inc. v. University of Illinois Foundation, 402 U.S.
313, 327 (1971). See text at notes 26-27 infra,
18. E.g., Divine v. Commissioner, 500 F.2d 1041 (2d Cir. 1974); Charles M. Demuth,
57 T.C. 225 (1971), affd., 470 F.2d 710 (2d Cir. 1972); William A. Belcher, Jr., 24 CCH
TAX CT. MEM. 1 (1965); Elsie Keil Mathisen, 22 T.C. 995 (1954). Other decisions have
sustained the rule in dictum. E.g., Walter Wilson Flora, 47 T.C. 410, 413 (1967); Ronald
F. Weiszman, 31 CCH TAX CT. MEM, 1201 (1972), affd., 483 F.2d 817 (10th Cir, 1973);
Matt R. Kane, 30 CCH TAX CT. ME.Ill'. 943 (1971); Estate of Sol Goldenberg, 23 CCH
TAX CT. MEM, 810 (1964), affd,, 66-1 CCH U.S.T.C. ,J 9297 (9th Cir, 1966). But see
Baily v. United States, 350 F. Supp. 1205, affd, on rehearing, 355 F. Supp. 325 (E,D, Pa,
1972); Sparks Nugget, Inc., 29 CCH TAX CT. ME.Ill'. 318 (1970).
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are no convincing reasons for retaining the rule in tax cases involving the same tax year.
The mutuality rule has two components: First, a judgment
cannot bind a stranger who has not had his day in court; second,
strangers to a judgment cannot assert that judgment against parties
to the previous action. The first proposition is required by the due
process clauses of the fifth and fourteenth amendments of the Constitution, which guarantee all aggrieved parties a proper hearing
in court.19 The second proposition was long assumed to be a corollary of the first-if a person was not bound by a prior adjudication,
he should not benefit from it: 20
The justification for this requirement has been said to be that a
party may be unwilling to press his case to the utmost in a particular suit, and that it would penalize him to enable strangers to
take advantage of his laxity; that an adversary system requires that
a party to an action should [normally] risk the loss of rights or the
creation of liabilities only with reference to his adversaries; or that a
jury may often reach results inconsistent with the truth, and that
such a mishap should not affect a losing party outside the particular litigation.21

Several courts began to diminish the importance of the second
requirement by creating a broad exception to its application in
derivative liability situations.22 The major blow to the doctrine
came in 1942, when the California Supreme Court, in the landmark
case of Bernhard v. Bank of America National Trust & Savings
Association,23 explicitly rejected rigid mutuality as a strict requirement of collateral estoppel: "There is no compelling reason ... for
requiring that the party asserting the plea of res judicata must have
been a party, or in privity with a party, to the earlier litigation."24
19. See note 8 supra.
20. Bigelow v. Old Dominion Copper Mining 8: Smelting Co., 225 U.S. 111 (1912);
Litchfield v. Goodnow's Admr., 123 U.S. 549 (1887); Graves v. Associated Transp.,
Inc., 344 F.2d 894-, 896 (4th Cir. 1965); l A. FREEMAN, supra note 16, § 428.
The second proposition is not in fact required by due process, since collateral estoppel
would be applied only against one who did participate in the prior adjudication. See
Blonder-Tongue Laboratories, Inc. v. University of Illinois Foundation, 402 U.S. 313,
330 (1971); Note, Impacts of the Defensive and Offensive Assertion of Collateral Estoppel by a Non-Party, 35 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 1010, 1014 n.31 (1967). Rather, the requirement has been supported by the "assumed unfairness" of binding one party to the
prior judgment but not the other. REsrATEMENT, supra note 1, § 96, comment a.
21. Developments, supra note 7, at 862 (footnotes omitted).
22, Derivative liability situations include cases in which liability is based on the
master-servant, principal-agent, or indemnitor-indemnitee relationships. See Note, The
Requirement of Mutuality in Estoppel by Judgement, 29 !LL. L. REv. 93, 94- (1934-);
Annot., 31 A.L.R.3d 104-4-, 1065-66 (1970).
23. 19 Cal. 2d 807, 122 P .2d 892.
24. 19 Cal. 2d at 812, 122 P.2d at 894-.
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In place of the mutuality rule, the court outlined three requirements
for the application of collateral estoppel: "Was the issue decided in
the prior adjudication identical with the one presented in the action
in question? Was there a final judgment on the merits? Was the
party against whom the plea is asserted a party or in privity with a
party to the prior adjudication?" 25
Since Bernhard, a continued trend "away from the rigid requirements of mutuality" has taken place in both the federal26 and state
courts.27 The mutuality rule has largely been replaced by a particularized approach to the application of the doctrine of collateral
estoppel.28 In reviewing the facts of each case, the courts will consider competing policies and determine the equity of precluding
one party from rearguing an issue that was resolved against that
party in an earlier litigation.29 For example, courts increasingly
reject the mutuality rule where a "prior judgment [is] invoked
defensively in a second action against a plaintiff bringing suit on an
issue he litigated and lost as a plaintiff in a prior action." 80
The mutuality rule, however, has been retained by most courts
in tax cases.81 In Rogers v. Commissioner,82 for example, the court
dealt with the dissolution of the joint venture Range-Liberty. Mrs.
Rogers, the sole shareholder of Range, had personally cosigned with
Range the initial venture agreement and had agreed to create an
escrow security fund. Liberty, in buying out the interest of Range,
contracted to pay Range and Mrs. Rogers separately. The Commissioner argued that the payments to Mrs. Rogers constituted
25. 19 Cal. 2d at 813, 122 P.2d at 895.
26. 1B J. MooRE, FEDERAL PRACTICE 92 (Supp. 1973); Annot., 31 A.L.R.3d 1044, 1067
(1970).
27. Abolition was neither "instantaneous nor universal" in the state courts, but a
trend away from the rule has become apparent. See Blonder-Tongue Laboratories, Inc.
v. University of Illinois Foundation, 402 U.S. 314, 326 (1971). See also Currie, Civil Procedure: The Tempest Brews, 53 CALIF. L. REv. 25, 38 (1965); Annot., 31 A.L,R.3d 1044,
1067 (1970).
28. Currie, supra note 27, at 32-33; Polasky, supra note 3, at 222; Note, Collateral
Estoppel: The Demise of Mutuality, 52 CORNELL L.Q. 724, 725, 727-28 (1967), E.g.,
Graves v. Associated Transp., Inc., 344 F.2d 894, 900 (4th Cir. 1965); Zdanok v. Glidden
Co., 327 F.2d 944, 954-55 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 377 U.S. 934 (1964).
29. "The rule of non-mutuality is not a general one but a limited one to be determined from the facts and circumstances in each case whether or not it should be ap•
plied." United States v. United Airlines, 216 F. Supp. 709, 726 (E.D. Wash. 1962), affd,,
335 F.2d 379 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 379 U.S. 951 (1964). See also Blonder-Tongue Laboratories, Inc. v. University of Illinois Foundation, 402 U.S. 313, 327 (1971); Divine v.
Commissioner, 500 F.2d 1041, 1048-50 (2d Cir. 1974); Zdanok v. Glidden Co., 327 F.2d
944, 953 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 377 U.S. 934 (1964); Bruszewski v. United States, 181
F.2d 419, 421 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 340 U.S. 865 (1950).
30. Blonder-Tongue Laboratories, Inc. v. University of Illinois Foundation, 402 U.S.
313, 324 (1971) (footnote omitted).
31. See cases cited note 18 supra.
32. 180 F.2d 720 (3d Cir. 1950).
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ordinary income to her as a distribution of proceeds from the sale
of the assets of Range. The Third Circuit, reversing the Tax Court,
held that Mrs. Rogers was entitled to capital gains treatment on
the contract payments; she was a real party in interest, and the
purchase contract represented a sale of her interest in the venture.83
The identical transaction was relitigated in the Tax Court and appealed to the Second Circuit,34 where the corporation, Range, was
the respondent-taxpayer. The Tax Court refused to be bound by
the Third Circuit's finding because the parties were not identical,35
and again held that the contract with Mrs. Rogers represented payments made to Range and then distributed to Mrs. Rogers. Accordingly, the corporation was held to have received capital gain on
the payments to Mrs. Rogers. 86 The Second Circuit affirmed the
Tax Court's refusal to apply res judicata.37 Consequently, both Mrs.
Rogers and Range recognized capital gain from the Mrs. RogersLiberty contract. If the modem theory of collateral estoppel88 had
been applied, Range would have been able to bind the Commissioner-the initiating party in Rogers-to the resolution of the
distribution issue in the Third Circuit. Similar applications of the
mutuality rule continue to find expression in other tax cases.89
Such applications may be explained, if not justified, by a misapplication of precedent. Arguments concerning the appropriateness of collateral estoppel in tax cases have arisen most often in
litigation involving similar transactions that take place in successive
years.4 Few cases have considered the application of the mutuality
rule in other than the successive-year context.41 Similarly, most

°

33. 180 F.2d at 723-24.
34. American Range Lines, Inc., 17 T.C. 764 (1951), afjd., 200 F.2d 844 (2d Cir. 1952).
35. 17 T.C. at 771.
36. 17 T.C. at 771.
37. 200 F.2d at 845.
38. See text at note 30 supra.
39. See cases cited note 18 supra.
40. See cases mllected in Annot., 130 AL.R. 374, 376-77 (1941).
The Supreme Court explained the application of collateral estoppel to cases involving succeeding tax periods in Commissioner v. Sunnen, 333 U.S. 591, 598 (1948):
Income taxes are levied on an annual basis. Each year is the origin of a new liability and of a separate cause of action. Thus if a claim of liability or non-liability relating to a particular tax year is litigated, a judgment on the merits is res
judicata as to any subsequent proceeding involving the same claim and the same
tax year. But if the later proceeding is concerned with a similar or unlike claim
relating to a different tax year, the prior judgment acts as a collateral estoppel
only as to those matters in the second proceeding which were actually presented
and determined in the first suit.
41. But see Divine v. Commissioner, 500 F.2d 1041 (2d Cir. 1974); Baily v. United
States, 355 F. Supp. 325 (E.D. Pa. 1973).
A closely related question concerns the relationship of the three parties who might
represent the government in a tax case: (1) the United States, (2) the Commissioner of
Internal Revenue, or (3) a local tax collector. The mutuality problem generally was
resolved by holding that all of these government representatives were in privity with
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scholarly discussions of collateral estoppel in federal tax litigation
consider only multiple-period applications.42 Unfortunately, bot~
courts and commentators have assumed that because collateral
estoppel is applied narrowly in the multiple-year context,48 it should
be applied narrowly with respect to all aspects of federal tax
litigation.44
The Supreme Court first confronted the application of collateral
estoppel to a tax case involving successive tax years in Tait v.
Western Maryland Railway Co.45 In that case, the Court had to
determine the amount of amortization allowable on bond discounts.
The taxpayer had successfully litigated the issue in an action concerning his 1918 and 1919 tax returns, but the government sought
a new determination with respect to tax years 1920-1925. The government's main argument was that "a judgment in a suit concerning
income tax for a given year cannot estop either of the parties in a
later action touching liability for taxes of another year." 40 The
Court responded: "As petitioner says, the scheme of the Revenue
Acts is an imposition of tax for annual periods, and the exaction for
one year is distinct from that for any other. But it does not follow
that Congress in adopting this system meant to deprive the government and the taxpayer of relief from redundant litigation ...."·17
The Court reviewed the facts and the law involved in the two
each other. Consequently, collateral estoppel could bind each of them as a result of
initial litigation against one of them. Some decisions, however, held that suit against
a collector was personal, and therefore privity between the United States and the
collector did not e.xist. This problem was resolved by the adoption of Internal Revenue
Code of 1939, § 3772(d) (now INT. R.Ev. CODE oF 1954, § 7422(c)), which provides for
the application of res judicata in such cases. See Griswold, Res Judicata in Federal
Tax Cases, 46 YALE L.J. 1320, 1340-43 (1937); Annot., 130 AL.R. 374, 382-84 (1941).
Many tax cases have applied collateral estoppel against persons in privity with former
litigants. See, e.g., Hilton Lumber Co. v. Grissom, 70 F.2d 892 (4th Cir.), cert. denied,
293 U.S. 613 (1934); Seaboard Commercial Corp., 28 T.C. 1034 (1957): D. Bruce Forrester, 4 T.C. 907 (1945).
42. See, e.g., Griswold, supra note 41, at 1327; Heckman, Collateral Estoppel as the
Answer to Multiple Litigation Problems in Federal Tax Law: Another View of Sunnen
and The Evergreens, 19 CAsE W. R.Es. L. REv. 230 (1968); Raum, The Sunnen Case and
Res Judicata in Federal Tax Litigation, 7 N.Y.U. INsr. ON FED. TAX. 253 (1949); Note,
Collateral Estoppel as to Questions of Law in Federal Tax Cases, 35 IowA L. R.Ev. 700
(1950).
43. See, e.g., Trapp v. United States, 177 F.2d 1, 4 (10th Cir. 1949), cert. denied, 339
U.S. 913 (1950); Gillespie v. Commissioner, 151 F.2d 903, 906 (10th Cir. 1945), cert.
denied, 328 U.S. 839 (1946); Journal-Tribune Publishing Co., 38 T.C, 733, 744-45 (1962):
Griswold, supra note 41, at 1357; Note, supra note 42, at 711, 713.
44. E.g., Parker v. Westover, 221 F.2d 603, 605 (9th Cir. 1955) (dictum): Polasky,
supra note 3, at 235; Raum, supra note 42, at 262.
45. 289 U.S. 620 (1933).
46. 289 U.S. at 623.
47. 289 U.S. at 624.
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actions, found them identical, and held that the government was
estopped from relitigating the amortization issue.48
After Tait, several cases applied collateral estoppel in multiple
tax-year litigation.40 However, criticism of the Tait decision50 led
the Court to limit its scope. Blair v. Commissioner5 1 soon established
one of the major limitations on collateral estoppel in tax litigation:
An intervening change in legal climate will render collateral estoppel
inapplicable in subsequent proceedings.52 The Court further limited
Tait in Commissioner v. Sunnen. 53 The taxpayer argued that an
earlier proceeding against him before the Board of Tax Appeals
involving payments under a 1928 contract collaterally estopped the
48. 289 U.S. at 625-26.
49. See Wobber Bros. v. Commissioner, 31 B.T.A. 133 (1934); Portage Silica Co. v.
Commissioner, 29 B.T.A. 881 (1934), afjd., 89 F.2d 958 (6th Cir.), cert, denied, 302 U.S.
711 (1937); Leininger v. Commissioner, 29 B.T.A. 874 (1934), afjd., 86 F.2d 791 (6th
Cir. 1937).
50, E.g., Special Committee on Federal Taxation of the American Bar Association,
61 A.B.A. ANN. REP. 821, 831 (1936):
As a result of this decision, if the taxpayer secures a decision of a court, even
though not the Supreme Court, with respect to a particular income tax question
which recurs in later years, he becomes entitled to the benefit, or subject to the
burden, of the decision, even though it is later determined in other cases that the
decision is wrong. This causes a lack of uniformity in the application of the law
among the taxpayers and this result does not seem to be required by any fundamental principle involved in the doctrine of res adjudicata. The year liugated is
of course closed by the judgment, but there seems to be no reason why the taxpayer should be treated more or less favorably in a later year than the law as
finally determined warrants, merely because he had litigation about some previous year's taxes. This point deserves further study to determine whether or not
the principle of the Tait v. Western Maryland Railway Company decision as applied to subsequent years should be changed by legislation.
See also Griswold, supra note 41, at 1320.
51. 300 U.S. 5 (1937).
52. The Court in Tait noted that there had been no changes in the relevant
revenue acts and treasury regulations between the two cases there at issue, and consequently collateral estoppel could be applied. 289 U.S. at 625-26. Blair involved an intervening state court decision, however, rather than a change in statutory law, and
thus expanded the concerns expressed in Tait to encompass any change in legal climate. 300 U.S. at 9. Blair has been relied upon in many subsequent cases. E.g., Corrigan
v. Commissioner, 155 F.2d 164, 166 (6th Cir. 1946); Commissioner v. Arundel-Brooks
Concrete Corp., 152 F.2d 225, 227 (4th Cir. 1945); Commissioner v. Security-First Natl.
Bank, 148 F.2d 937, 940 (9th Cir. 1945); Pelham Hall Co. v. Hassett, 147 F.2d 63 (1st
Cir. 1945).
The rationale for the Blair rule was summarized in Commissioner v. Sunnen, 333
U.S. 591, 599 (1948):
A taxpayer may secure a judicial determination of a particular tax matter, a matter wliich may recur without substantial variation for some years thereafter. But
a subsequent modification of the significant facts or a change or development in
the controlling legal principles may make that determination obsolete or erroneous, at least for future purposes. If such a determination is then perpetuated
each succeeding year -as to the taxpayer involved in the original litigation, he is
accorded a tax treatment different from that given to other taxpayers of the same
class. As a result, there are inequalities in the administration of the revenue laws,
discriminatory distinctions in tax liability, and a fertile basis for litigious confusion.
53. 333 U .s. 591 (1948).
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Commissioner from relitigating the taxable status of later payments
under that contract and under identical contracts that had been
separately negotiated.64 The Court could have rejected the application of collateral estoppel on the basis of Blair,r;5 but chose instead
to reconsider the "identical facts" requirement of Tait in deciding
whether to apply collateral estoppel as to the separate contracts:
0£ course, where a question of fact essential to the judgment is actually litigated and determined in the first tax proceeding, the parties
are bound by that determination in a subsequent proceeding even
though the cause of action is different. . . • And if the very same
facts and no others are involved in the second case, a case relating
to a different tax year, the prior judgment will be conclusive as to
the same legal issues which appear, assuming no intervening doctrinal change. But if the relevant facts in the two cases are separable,
even though they be similar or identical, collateral estoppel does not
govern the legal issues which recur in the second case. Thus the
second proceeding may involve an instrument or transaction identical with, but in a form separable from, the one dealt with in the
first proceeding. In that situation, a court is free in the second proceeding to make an independent examination of the legal matters at
issue.56

Sunnen involved identical parties, and therefore does not bear
directly on the mutuality rule. However, in dictum apparently
gleaned from common-law collateral estoppel concepts,07 the Court
made clear that there would be no estoppel where the parties were
different.08
Unfortunately, later decisions have relied upon the Sunnen
dictum to deny the application of collateral estoppel in cases involving the same tax event and the same tax year.6°For example, in
Harold S. Divine60 the Tax Court rejected a shareholder's argument
that collateral estoppel be applied, even though a circuit court had
previously held in favor of another shareholder of the same corporation on the same tax issue with regard to the same corporate
transaction.61 The court noted that "(i]n the cases which have come
before this Court involv¥}g the question of mutuality we have
voiced adherence to the mutuality principle, following the lead set
54. 333 U.S. at 596.
55. 333 U.S. at 600.
56. 333 U.S. at 601 (footnotes omitted),
57. 1133 U.S. at 597-98,
58. 333 U.S. at 597-98.
59. E.g., Harold S. Divine, 59 T.C. 152, 158 (1972), revd. on other grounds, 500
F.2d 1041 (2d Cir. 1974); William A. Belcher, Jr., 24 CCH TAX Cr. MEM. 1, 12 (1965).
60. 59 T.C. 152 (1972), revd. on other grounds, 500 F.2d 1041 (2d Cir, 1974),
61. 59 T.C. at 158.
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by the Supreme Court in Commissioner v. Sunnen ... and Tait v.
Western Md. Ry. Co . ..•" 62
Relying on Sunnen and Tait to sustain the rigid rule of mutuality in tax litigation has two flaws. First, cases involving successive
tax years are distinguishable from cases involving the same tax year.
In Sunnen, the Court justified its strict approach to collateral
estoppel by pointing to the potential that subsequent changes in
facts or law would make a present determination obsolete or erroneous by the time it was applied in future litigation.il8 But the
danger that the facts or law will shift over the years is not present
in cases growing out of the same fact situation and concerning the
tax liability of similarly situated parties for the same year. Second,
Sunnen did not provide an explicit rationale for its dictum requiring
mutuality. The Sunnen Court purported to apply common-law
concepts,64 but with the deterioration of those concepts in other
areas,65 the Sunnen mutuality rule must be questioned unless policy
factors peculiar to tax litigation independently support its retention.
Although early cases largely ignored the justifications for the
mutuality rule,66 the recent case of Divine v. Commissioner61 has
suggested considerations that arguably justify the rule's continued
vitality in tax cases. The Rapid American Corporation had made a
cash distribution to its shareholders in 1961, and one of its shareholders had successfully argued in the Seventh Circuit that the distribution was a return of capital and not taxable. Divine, arguing in
a later case for similar treatment ·with respect to the same distribution,
asserted that the Seventh Circuit opinion bound the Commissioner
to refrain from taxing the payments. Both the Second Circuit and
the Tax Court rejected Divine's position, arguing that the use of
collateral estoppel would hinder the uniform application of the tax
laws68 and inhibit the clarification of difficult provisions of the
Internal Revenue Code.69
The Tax Court asserted that invoking collateral estoppel in
Divine would lead to inconsistent application of the tax law in
two situations. First, "an unwarranted distinction" between the
treatment of shareholders of one corporation and that of "identically
situated shareholders" of other corporations might result, "thereby
disturbing the uniformity in the application of the tax laws." 7° Con62.
63.
64.
65.
66.
67.
68.
69.
70.

59 T.C. at 158.
See note 52 supra.
333 U.S. at 597-98.
See text at notes 26-30 supra.
E.g., Appeal of Charles L. Suhr, 4 B.T.A. 1198 (1926).
500 F.2d 1041 (2d Cir. 1974), revg. 59 T.C. 152 (1972).
500 F.2d at 1048; 59 T.C. at 159-60.
500 F,2d at 1049-50; 59 T.C. at 159.
59 T.C. at 160.
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sistency in results, however, also would support the application of
collateral estoppel, because estoppel would result in uniform treatment of all of the shareholders of the same corporation. If courts
are forced to choose between imposing different treatment on shareholders of one corporation vis-a-vis shareholders of another corporation and imposing different treatment on shareholders of the same
corporation, they should find the first alternative less objectionable.
Dissimilar treatment among shareholders of different corporations
may often be explained by subtle factual distinctions. 71 Such distinctions are less likely among shareholders in the same corporation, at
least with respect to issues of corporate taxation.
The Tax Court also argued that applying collateral estoppel on
the basis of the previous Seventh Circuit opinion72 would "be disrupting to the uniformity in the application of the law within the
jurisdiction of any circuit court of appeals which might disagree
with the Seventh Circuit's holding . . . , because Rapid's shareholders throughout the country would benefit from the collateral
estoppel effects of [the Seventh Circuit's decision] regardless of the
view taken by their own circuit." 73 However, uniformity in the
application of a national tax law would be optimally achieved only
if the law is applied with similar effect on a national scale.74 Allowing the value of intra-circuit uniformity to outweigh the uniform
national application of the tax law seems incongruous, for the federal
tax law is designed to apply consistently on a national scale. Indeed,
the application of collateral estoppel would enhance rather than
hinder the uniform application of the tax law. Under the present
s~ucture, the taxpayer seeking to contest his ta.x liability may
choose between refusing to pay his assessed taxes and arguing his
case in the Tax Court75 and paying his tax and suing for a refund
in a federal district court76 or in the Court of Claims. 77 Appeals
71. See, e.g., Charles M. Bernuth, 57 T.C. 225,233 (1971),
72. The case referred to is Luckman v. Commissioner, 418 F.2d 381 (7th Cir. 1969),
in which another shareholder of the same corporation had successfully litigated the
same issue on the same facts against the Commissioner.
73. 59 T.C. at 159-60.
74. See Prewett v. Commissioner, 221 F.2d 250, 252 (8th Cir. 1955); Estate of Wil•
liam E. Edmonds, Jr., 16 T.C. 110, 117 (1951) (dictum); Nevitt, Achieving Uniformity
Among the 11 Courts of Last Resort, 34 TAXES 311, 312 (1956).
75. INT. R.Ev. CODE of 1954, § 6213(a).
76. INT. R.Ev. CoDE of 1954, § 7422; 28 u.s.c. § 1346(a)(l) (1970).
77. 28 U.S.C. § 1346(a)(l) (1970).
The system's inequities have often been criticized. See Griswold, supra note 41, at
1154-63; Traynor, Administrative and Judicial Procedure for Federal Income, Estate,
and Gift Taxes-a Criticism and a Proposal, 38 CoLUM. L. R.Ev, 1393, 1406-11 (1938);
Comment, The Tax Court, the Court of Appeals and Pyramiding Judicial Review, 9
STAN. L. R.Ev. 827 (1957).
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from the Tax Court78 and from a district court70 may be taken in
the appropriate circuit court. & a result, when two circuits differ
on a particular issue, the outcome of the litigation may depend on
where the appeal from the Tax Court is taken or on which district
court initially hears the proceeding. In multiple-shareholder and
multiple-partner transactions that involve parties located in different circuits, similarly situated litigants could receive different
tax treatment unless collateral estoppel were applied.so
A broader application of the doctrine of collateral estoppel
would reduce the often-discussed81 anomaly of the Tax Court's
"Golsen rule." In an effort to promote uniformity by acting as a
national spokesman, the Tax Court at one time refused to be bound
by decisions of the various courts of appeals.82 Typically, however,
the taxpayer would appeal and the interpretation of the reviewing
court of appeals would prevai1.sa Needless appeals were thus necessitated.s4 In Jack E. Golsens5 the Tax Court finally agreed to. follow
a decision that was "squarely in point" and was decided by the court
to which appeal lay.so Although the Golsen doctrine normally will
result in the elimination of duplicative appeals, it may lead to
anomalous results when two or more decisions of the Tax Court
involving the same facts are appealable to two or more courts of
appeals.s7 For example, two fifty-per cent shareholders of the same
78. INT. R.Ev. CODE of 1954, § 7482(a).
79. 28 u.s.c. § 1291 (1970).
80. See, e.g., text at notes 88-92 infra.
81. See, e.g., Note, Status of a Controversy: The Tax Court, the Courts of Appeals,
and Judicial Review, 32 Omo S1;. L.J. 164, 167-69 (1971).
82. E.g., Arthur L. Lawrence, 27 T.C. 713, 719-20 (1957), afjd., 258 F.2d 562 (9th
Cir. 1958).
83. Norvel Jeff McLellan, 51 T.C. 462, 467 (1968) (Simpson, J., concurring).
84. Jack E. Golsen, 54 T.C. 742, 757 (1970), afjd., 445 F.2d 985 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 940 (1971); Comment, Heresy in the Hierarchy: Tax Court Rejection of
Court of Appeals Precedents, 57 CoLUM. L. REv. 717, 722-23 (1957); Note, supra note
81, at 167. The courts of appeals were highly critical of the Tax Court's disregard of
their decisions. See 9 J. MERTENS, LAW OF FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION § 51.03, at 7
{1970).
85. 54 T.C. 742 (1970), afjd., 445 F.2d 985 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 940
(1971).
86. 54 T.C. at 757.
87•••• [I]t frequently happens that a decision of the Tax Court is appealable
to two or even more Courts of Appeals. A few examples will illustrate. A corporation, having stockholders scattered over the United States, makes a distribution to
all. The Commissioner holds it taxable as a dividend from accumulated earnings.
The stockholders join in a trial before the Tax Court which decides the issue as
to all petitioning stockholders, contrary to a decision of Court of Appeals A,
which reversed a prior Tax Court decision, but perhaps in line with an affirming
decision of Court of Appeals B.••• If it had rendered a separate different decision for those stockholders in Circuit A, what amount of accumulated earnings
would remain for future distribution?
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corporation went before the Tax Court in companion cases,
Doehring v. Commissioner8 8 and Puckett v. Commissioner, 80 to
determine whether the corporation's subchapter S status00 had been
terminated. In Doehring, appeal was to the Eighth Circuit and the
government prevailed. In Puckett, appeal was to the Fifth Circuit,
which had enunciated a different interpretation of the law in a
previous decision,91 and the taxpayer prevailed under the Golsen
doctrine. As a result, co-owners of the same corporation took the
same issue and the same facts to the same forum and received different treatment. Application of collateral estoppel, unfettered by
the mutuality rule, would minimize the anomaly. 92 Although collateral estoppel may have little salutary effect in simultaneous cases
such as Doehring and Puckett,93 the doctrine could be applied to
successive cases dealing with similarly situated taxpayers to bind the
Tax Court and the reviewing circuit in the second proceeding to
the resolutions reached earlier. The Tax Court still must face the
Golsen issue-whether to defer to the settled law of the reviewing
circuit-in the first proceeding, but co-owners of the same corporation in subsequent suits on the same issue would not receive different
treatment.
Another characteristic of tax litigation advanced by the Divine
court to justify the application of the mutuality rule is the need for
clarification of the Internal Revenue Code. 94 The court, apparently
contradicting its own argument on the need for uniformity in applying the tax law,95 argued that the application of collateral estoppel
in tax litigation would reduce the development of circuit court
conflicts and thus lessen the likelihood of subsequent Supreme Court
review, which is necessary to clarify the Iani.06
This argument has several weaknesses. First, although interArthur L. Lawrence, 27 T.C. 713, 718-19 (1957), afld., 258 F.2d 562 (9th Cir. 1958). The
court's hypothetical case closely parallels the facts in Divine. See text at notes 67-69
supra.
88. 33 CCH TAX Cr. MEM. 1035 (1974).
89. 33 CCH TAX Cr. MEM. 1038 (1974).
90. See INT. REv. CODE of 1954, § 1372(e)(5).
91. House v. Commissioner, 453 F.2d 982 (5th Cir. 1972).

92. Collateral estoppel will not always apply in such situations, however. For ex•
ample, if the government wins the first suit, subsequent actions may be brought by
other shareholders since their right to be heard in court is guaranteed by due process.
See note 8 supra.
93. Even in simultaneous suits, however, one party may argue for a rehearing of
his case on the basis of the resolution of the companion case. Cf, Baily v. United
States, 350 F. Supp. 1205, afld. on rehearing, 355 F. Supp. 325 (E.D. Pa. 1973).
94. 500 F.2d at 1049-50; 59 T.C. at 159.
95. See 500 F.2d at 1048; 59 T.C. at 159-60.
96. 500 F.2d at 1049-50, 59 T.C. at 159.
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circuit conflict is a ground for the grant of certiorari,91 it does not
guarantee review. 98 Supreme Court Rule 19 states that review on a
·writ of certiorari is not a matter of right, and the Court traditionally
has been reluctant to hear tax cases.99 Refusals of certiorari are
therefore likely results in cases of inter-circuit conflict, and will
cause confusion rather than clarification.100 Second, the litigants in
the conflicting cases may be unwilling to seek review in the Supreme
Court. The added delay101 and expense may be prohibitive,102 and
in many cases the contested tax liability may be too small to justify
the appeal.103 Conflict resolution may therefore be delayed until a
willing taxpayer ·will support the appeal. Third, the mutuality rule
restricts the application of collateral estoppel with regard to factual
as well as legal issues. Allowing district courts and the Tax Court
to reexamine strictly factual questions will not create conflicts that
give rise to Supreme Court review and clarification of the tax law;
only conflicts over legal issues can cause the desired result. Fourth,
the elimination of the mutuality rule would not eliminate circuit97. The most common method of review of courts of appeals decisions is by the
statutory writ of certiorari. Such review is discretionary. See C. WRIGHT, LAw OF FEDERAL COURTS § 106, at 476-77 (1970). Review also may be had in specialized instances
by appeal. 28 U.S.C. § 1252 (1970). Finally, the courts of appeals may certify new or
difficult questions of law to the Supreme Court, 28 U.S.C. 1254(3) (1970), although
this procedure has rarely been used. 9 J. MER.TENS, supra note 84, § 51.20, at 41 (1970).
98. 9 J. MERTENS, supra note 84, § 51.20, at 39 n.95; Comment, Denial of Certiorari
Despite a Conflict, 66 HARV. L. R.Ev. 465, 472 (1963).
In Maryland v. Baltimore Radio Show, 338 U.S. 912 (1950), the Court denied certiorari despite an apparent conflict with a previous Supreme Court decision. Justice
Frankfurter's opinion discussed the denial of certiorari:
A variety of considerations underlie denials of the writ, and as to the same petition different reasons may lead different Justices to the same result •••• Narrowly technical reasons may lead to denials•••• A decision may satisfy all these
technical requirements and yet may commend itself for review to fewer than four
members of the Court. Pertinent considerations of judicial policy here come into
play. A case may raise an important question but the record may be cloudy. It
may be desirable to have different aspects of an issue further illuminated by the
lower courts. Wise adjudication has its own time for ripening.
338 U.S. at 917-18.
99. 9 J. MERTENS, supra note 84, § 51.20, at 38 n.94; Paul, Dobson v. Commissioner:
The Strange Ways of Law and Fact, 57 HARV. L. R.Ev. 753, 786-87 n.145 (1944).
100. See Traynor &: Surrey, New Roads Toward the Settlement of Federal Income,
Estate, and Gift Tax Controversies, 7 LAW &: CONTEMP. PROB. 336, 350 (1940).
IOI. See R. MAGILL, THE IMPACT OF FEDERAL TAXES 209 (1943).
102. See Griswold, supra note 41, at 1156. Cf. Blonder-Tongue Laboratories, Inc. v.
University of Illinois Foundation, 402 U.S. 313, 338 (1971), where the court discussed
the same problem with respect to patent litigation: "[P]rospective defendants will often
decide that paying royalties under a license or other settlement is preferable to the
costly burden of challenging the patent."
103. "Various considerations, other than the actual merits, may govern a party in
bringing fonvard grounds of recovery or defense in one action, which may not exist
in another action upon a different demand, such as the smallness of the amount or
the value of the property in controversy, the difficulty of obtaining the necessary evidence, the expense of litigation, and his own situation at the time." Cromwell v.
County of Sac, 94 U.S. 351, 356 (1876).
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court conflicts. The circuit courts would continue to disagree on
interpretations of various provisions of the tax code. They would
be bound by each others' decisions only in so far as those decisions
concerned similarly situated taxpayers disputing the incidents of the
same tax event in the same tax year as the case before them. Thus,
while clarification of the tax law is an important policy consideration, the continued vitality of the mutuality rule is of questionable
significance in achieving that goal.
Finally, it might be argued that to employ collateral estoppel in
tax litigation without applying the mutuality rule would limit the
ability of the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) to collect the national
revenue. A Director in one jurisdiction could be bound by litigation
instituted and completed (and perhaps mishandled) by a Director
in another jurisdiction.104 As a result, the second Director's attempts
at settlement, as well as subsequent litigation, may be significantly
influenced by a circuit court's treatment of a similarly situated taxpayer in another jurisdiction.105 In large corporate transactions, for
example, an early loss to one shareholder would bind the Commissioner in all of his dealings with other shareholders. Flexibility,
however, should be required only when IRS Directors confront
different factual circumstances. The IRS has a duty of consistency
toward identically situated taxpayers,100 and that duty should not be
ignored simply to allow the IRS to have more than one chance to
win important cases.
In sum, the application of the mutuality rule in tax cases cannot
be explained by policy considerations unique to ta.'C litigation.
Absent such considerations, the general policy factors that have resulted in the abolition of the mutuality rule in most nontax cases
apply with equal force to federal tax litigation. The need for judicial
104. There are seven Internal Revenue Regions in the United States, each containing several Internal Revenue Districts. While regional commissioners are rcspon•
sible for policy and program execution, the District Director's office is the one with
which the taxpayer usually deals. For further discussion of the organization of the
Internal Revenue Service, see B. Bl'lTKER &: L. STONE, FEDERAL INCOME, EsrATE AND
GIFr TAXATION 910 (1972).
105. Cf. Hearings on Treasury-Post Office Dept. Appropriations for 1957 Before the
Subcomm. of the Comm. on Appropriations, 84th Cong., 2d Sess. 463 (1957), reprinted
in 8 CCH STAND. FED. TAX REP. ,f 5876.017, at 66,205-10 (1975) (statement by the
chief counsel of the Internal Revenue Service arguing against binding the Service to
court of appeals decisions).
106.••• [T]he Commissioner has a duty of consistency toward similarly situated
taxpayers; he cannot properly concede capital gains treatment in one case and,
without adequate explanation, dispute it in another having seemingly identical
facts which is pending at the same time. • • • That the Commissioner's seeming
inconsistency may have arisen from the right hand's ignorance of the posture of
the left is little solace to taxpayers who are entitled to a non-discriminatory administration of the tax laws by him, much less to a taxpayer ••• who is disadvantaged by the discrimination in its case.
Sirbo Holdings, Inc. v. Commissioner, 476 F.2d 981, 987-88 (2d Cir. 1973). See also
Commissioner v. Chase Manhattan Bank, 259 F.2d 231, 237 (5th Cir, 1958).
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economy should never outweigh the availability of access to the
courts to resolve legal conflicts,107 but when the Commissioner has
one full and fair opportunity to press hi~ claim, and loses, the importance of conserving judicial time assumes great weight in subsequent cases raising the same issue.108 Forcing taxpayers to relitigate
leads to a "significant waste of time, expenses, anq. manpower."109
Furthermore, inconsistent treatment of identically situated taxpayers reflects adversely on the stability and rationality of the tax
system.110
The general trend toward reviewing the facts of each particular
case, weighing competing policies, and determining the equity of
·applying collateral estoppel111 should be extended to federal ta.x
litigation. However, the Second Circuit and the Tax Court, as
recently as 1974, have sustained the mutuality rule in federal tax
cases,112 and the rule has been rejected only by the Eastern District
of Pennsylvania in Baily v. United States.11 3 On its initial hearing,
the Pennsylvania court stated: "Since the plaintiff has had a 'full
and fair opportunity to try the factual issue' presently before this
Court, we conclude that no significant harm would result by the
invocation of collateral estoppel, absent mutuality." 114 The government moved to amend the judgment on rehearing, on the basis of
the Tax Court's decision in Divine,115 but the Pennsylvania court
refused to follow the Divine guidance. Although the Baily court
is alone in its viewpoint, its approach of considering the fairness
of applying collateral estoppel in the context of the facts of the case
before it110 should be the practice of the future if the policy judgments of Bernhard are accepted.117
107. The relative importance of judicial economy in this context was expressed in
Heckman, supra note 42, at 234: "Collateral estoppel should apply to as many issues
as possible to eliminate repetitive litigation. On the other hand, the doctrine should
be applied narrowly enough to ensure each party a fair hearing on all issues."
108. Bruszewski v. United States, 181 F.2d 419, 421 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 340 U.S.
865 (1950).
109. Baily v. United States, 350 F. Supp. 1205, 1210 (E.D. Pa. 1972).
110. See Blonder-Tongue Laboratories, Inc. v. University of lliinois Foundation, 402
U.S. 313, 329 (1971); Zdanok v. Glidden Co., 327 F.2d 944, 953 (2d Cir.), cert. denied,
377 U.S. 934 (1964).
111. "In the present state of evolution of the doctrine of collateral estoppel its invocation has seemed to depend on the existence of circumstantial assurances of the
fairness of applying it in the particular case. It is not approached with the inflexibility
and the insistence on the dominance of principle that generally characterizes the application of the doctrine of res judicata • • ••" Agrashell, Inc. v. Bernand Sirotta Co.,
281 F. Supp. 704, 707 (E.D.N.Y. 1968). See also text at notes 23-29 supra.
112. See Divine v. Commissioner, 49 T.C. 152 (1972), affd., 500 F.2_d 1041 (2d Cir.

m~

113.
114.
115.
ll6.
II7.

.

350 F. Supp. 1205, affd. on rehearing, 355 F. Supp. 325 (1973).
350 F. Supp. at 1209.
See text at notes 59-62 supra.
350 F. Supp. at 1210.
See text at notes 23-29 supra.

